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The resurgence of public shaming campaigns in modern societies has important 
antecedents in the relatively recent past. The paper addresses the practice of 
prorabotka, a ritual of public shaming that took place in schools, universities and 
workplaces in the Soviet Union. Prorabotka, whose genealogy can be traced to 
early post-revolutionary years, was aimed at the reinforcement of social norms 
challenged by political and moral deviance. Public shaming was applied to a wide 
range of behaviours, including ideological and moral deviations such as public 
drunkenness, marital infidelity by party members, planned emigration to Israel, 
etc. The paper applies a theoretical framework that builds on Durkheimian and 
neo-Durkheimian approaches to ritual, Garfinkel’s outline of the theory of public 
degradation ceremonies, and Zizek’s account of split law. It shows that, in addition 
to an official script, the meetings had a supplementary script that unleashed a 
jouissance of punitiveness but also generalised guilt and fear in the face of 
collective justice. It addresses the consequences of shaming for the perpetrators 
and members of the group. It is based on oral history interviews with individuals 
who participated in the meetings as denouncers, witnesses or perpetrators. 
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Introduction 
We are currently experiencing a renaissance of public shaming and character 
assassination campaigns, in which members of society express moral indignation 
about other individuals’ past and present behaviours. While the two practices are 
closely linked, there is an important distinction between character assassination and 
public shaming. Both represent a strategic attack on an individual’s moral worth, but 
while character assassination is performed by active denouncers, shaming mobilises 
members of the community. The community publicly unites in righteous anger against 
the shamed person, exposing collective representations of right and wrong and 
drawing the line between them. 
The nature of moral campaigns of various kinds—which involve denunciation 
and shaming by members of society but may also be manipulated or organised by state 
and corporate actors—raises a number of important issues. These issues concern the 
functioning of informal versus formal justice, the role of emotions in the enforcement 
of collective norms, and ultimately the reproduction of social order. The 
reintroduction of public emotions into penal law, in a process that reverses the post-
Enlightenment development of criminal justice and its institutions based on reason 
and universal legal procedures, has been extensively addressed by criminologists.1 Yet 
collective shaming as a form of communal justice—its unwritten rules and emotional 
dynamics—has not been well understood. Indeed, following the work of Braithwaite 
(1989), collective shaming is now commonly seen as a positive tool of community 
reintegration and is extensively used in restorative justice and post-conflict mediation. 
Informal justice may have many benefits in terms of citizens’ participation and its 
capacity to challenge existing power hierarchies and bring restitution to victims. 
However, as public shaming increasingly substitutes for formal procedural law, the 
complex emotions and psychic processes the former unleashes, and its consequences 
both for the targets of and the participants in judgement, call for renewed attention 
from social scientists. 
In this article, I analyse the situational dynamics of disciplinary prorabotka 
meetings in the USSR and their aftermath. Next, I use a theoretical framework that 
builds on Durkheimian and neo-Durkheimian approaches to ritual, Garfinkel’s outline 
of the theory of public degradation ceremonies and Zizek’s account of split law to 
analyse the ways in which the scripts of the meetings acted to fan moral indignation 
 
1 For a critical analysis of shame punishment in formal law, see Nussbaum (2004). See also 
Karstedt, Loader and Strang (2014) for a discussion of reason and emotion in crime and justice 
today. 
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and instigate jouissance of punitiveness, as well creating fear, embarrassment, shame 
and guilt. I conclude with further reflections on the democratisation of punishment 
and its consequences.  
Public Shaming in Soviet Union 
For students of public shaming, an abundance of historical data can be found in the 
socialist countries, where public shaming played a major role and where the practice 
remains within living memory (including the author’s own experiences). In the Soviet 
Union, the practice of shaming during group meetings, known as prorabotka (literally 
“working over”),2 was one of the central rituals of public life. In Russia and the USSR, 
this form of public shaming was introduced soon after the October 1917 revolution 
(Fitzpatrick, 1999; Halfin, 2007) and ended with the collapse of the Soviet regime. 
Public shaming took place in schools, universities and workplaces. The shaming 
procedure involved a variety of organisational mechanisms. It could be conducted by 
the Communist Party, by youth organisations such as the Komsomol and the “Young 
Pioneers,” by trade unions and labour collectives, or by schools and colleges. Public 
meetings that were ostensibly not intended to shame an individual often turned into 
such events.3 
The targets of prorabotka meetings were typically those individuals who were 
seen as having violated the norms of socialist morality. This was a very broad category 
based on unwritten rules.4 Ideological deviations, violations of work discipline, acts of 
moral misconduct such as drunkenness in public, marital infidelity (particularly in the 
case of Party members) or, from the early 1970s, planned emigration to Israel—all 
these behaviours were seen to testify to some moral defect and therefore demanded 
public condemnation. In some cases, the meetings were conducted at the request of 
law enforcement bodies,5 but for the most part, they were organised independently, 
typically by authority figures within organisations. The consequences for individuals 
 
2 It was also known as razborka, personal’noe delo or sud chesti.  
3 On occasions when a person needed a character reference (for example, when planning to travel 
abroad or join a Komsomol or Party organisation), the collective would be presented with an 
opportunity to examine previously unexplored and under-interpreted faults and misdemeanours; 
the meeting could also turn into a shaming event. 
4 Although the Party made an attempt to codify it in the “Moral Code of the Builder of 
Communism”, adopted in 1961. 
5 This concerned, for example, emigration to Israel. From 1970, according to the information note 
from the Ministry of Interior to the Central Committee of the CPSU of 26 February 1973, 
“preliminary discussion of the applicant’s reference at the general meeting of employees at the 
applicant’s place of work” became a part of the process for all wishing to emigrate to Israel (cited 
in Kuksin, 2007). 
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subjected to prorabotka ranged from reputational damage to a variety of disciplinary 
outcomes. This could be an official reprimand and demotion at work or expulsion from 
the organisation; in the Stalin era, it could have entailed arrest and imprisonment or 
even death.  
The existing literature shows that similar ceremonies and rituals of collective 
shaming were features of other socialist states (Dittmer, 1973; Flam, 1998). They 
coexisted with a variety of other forms of community sanctions, such as the so-called 
comrades’ courts at one’s work or place of residence (Gabdulhakov, 2018; Gorlizki, 
1998) as well as visual shaming via street posters or organisational wall newspapers 
(stengazety).  
The academic literature on prorabotka meetings under socialism is relatively 
scarce and addresses mainly the period from the revolution to the end of the Stalin era 
in the context of wider ideological and political campaigns. However, there seems to 
be a consensus that shaming was largely used as a tool of Party control. Indeed, Party 
members were subjected to shaming for certain acts that other citizens might not have 
been (including such symbolic deviations as loss of Party card, marital infidelity or 
divorce), and the consequences of shaming could be more serious for their lives and 
careers than for those of ordinary people. To become a Party member was to make a 
long-term commitment to Party morality, and shaming was one of the key weapons 
used to ensure this commitment (Cohn, 2015; Flam, 1998; Halfin, 2007). However, 
similar (albeit weaker) moral commitments were expected of members of the 
Komsomol organisations, as well as people who were not members of political 
organisations at all. Moreover, among the most famous campaigns of the 1940s–1950s 
in the USSR were campaigns against academic dissent, where political membership 
was not always significant. Scholars working in a wide range of subject areas, from 
biology to history, were subjected to what might be called heresy trials. While some 
authors see these events as designed to demonstrate the power of the Party and its 
leadership and crush any dissent among the scholarly community (Likhachev, 2015), 
others point out that collective shaming could also serve the interests of specific 
academic clans and groups, who used the meetings to destroy the reputations of their 
competitors (Leibovich, 2008).  
Some commentators focus on the role of the meetings as a means of establishing 
broad social conformity to the Soviet regime. In academic institutions, for example, 
the prorabotka campaigns had the effect of keeping scholars constantly attuned to the 
changing dominant discourse in their profession (Tikhonov, 2016). Ledeneva (2013) 
sees the practice of shaming and the pressure for individuals to admit to often non-
existent crimes and misdemeanours as part of a range of strategies employed by the 
Soviet system to make individuals compromise their personal integrity and submit, at 
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whatever personal cost, to its formal and informal rules. In addition to analysing the 
place of the meetings within the Soviet political system, scholars have also sought to 
trace their historical origins. Using Foucauldian analysis, Kharkhordin (1999) sees 
collective- and self-denunciation as rooted in the Orthodox Christian tradition of 
public penance and disciplinary practices aimed at the creation of a particular 
subjectivity, while Pushkareva (2012) emphasises the rural traditions of informal 
social control, particularly in relation to women.   
On a structural level, the use of public shaming also depended on the strengths 
of state and group power and the relationship between them. After Stalin, as violent 
state coercion weakened, community punishment became the main mechanism of 
social control (Gorlizky, 1998; LaPierre, 2012). With Khrushchev’s policies intended 
to “stimulate mass participation in corrective efforts” (Kharkhordin, 1999, p. 284), 
prorabotka meetings, alongside comrades’ courts and other forms of social control, 
became key institutions of community correction. But while deviance-hunting 
continued under Brezhnev, and even into Gorbachev’s perestroika, increasing 
routinisation of Soviet official practice meant that meaningful engagement by 
participants with the authoritative (official) discourse presented by organisers became 
less pronounced (Yurchak, 2005).  
Quite apart from the background factors that historically and structurally led to 
the flourishing or withering of this form of collective judgement, the meetings were 
also performances that need to be analysed in their own right. These were repeated 
forms of social communication based on a shared understanding of the intentions and 
contents of collective events. From a micro-sociological perspective, they were social 
dramas in every sense of the word. These Soviet morality plays, while following 
familiar scripts in a set organisational context, took the participants outside the realm 
of everyday communication and the key conventions of civility, where individuals 
strive to save each other’s public face in social situations (Goffman, 1959), and into the 
field of interactional violence. The intensity of such violence varied significantly, but 
the conditions for its release were there in the script, as the group moved from 
denouncing a particular violation to attacking the subject’s entire moral character. In 
the process, a space emerged for individual hostilities and repressed emotions to play 
out. Moreover, shaming was not only a socially traumatic event for the targets, who 
came under attack and whose social bonds were strained or broken as a result, with 
long-term adverse consequences for their identity (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991). It was 
also traumatic for other members of the group, people who did not share the moral 
indignation of the denouncers but were fearful of dissenting in the face of the outburst 
of collective righteousness and the power of the organisational authorities behind it. 
In other words, public shaming had a “supplementary” script and consequences that 
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are sometimes glossed over in purely functionalist accounts, which emphasise the 
communal unity achieved in such rituals, as well as making romantic representations 
of the curative power of citizens’ justice. 
Public Shaming Rituals: Collective Values, Meanings and 
Emotions 
The processes by which communities sanction members who have violated their 
norms have been extensively studied by social scientists. Stigmatisation and labelling 
of deviance, where a line is drawn between good and evil, the moral majority and the 
polluting individual(s), have been addressed in a number of classic studies (Becker, 
1963; Erikson, 2004; Goffman, 1963). Once the moral line is drawn, it typically leads 
to a purging organisational response (trial of the deviant, social isolation, expulsion or 
incarceration) that tends to take a ritualistic, ceremonial form. 
While there are many different approaches to ritual (Bell, 1992), according to 
the classic functionalist understanding, it is an event where core collective beliefs are 
generated, experienced and affirmed as real. As Durkheim argued in The Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life, in bringing individual moral transgressions to public 
judgement, society affirms existing mental constructions of good and evil and connects 
them to individual experience and action. In coming together in condemnation of 
people who break social norms, communities strengthen their social bonds. According 
to Durkheim (1915), “The very violence with which society reacts, by way of blame or 
material suppression, against every attempted dissidence, contributes to 
strengthening its empire by manifesting the common conviction through this burst of 
ardour” (p. 238).  
Neo-Durkheimian scholars apply this approach to ritual to a range of public 
performances in modern societies. Jeffrey Alexander argues that the binary division 
between sacred and profane, good and evil, continues to be intrinsic to the social 
construction of the public sphere. Exclusion and othering (whether through judicial 
and quasi-judicial punishment, moral panics or scandals) help society in its efforts to 
achieve fusion and sustain its moral values (Alexander, 2003, 2006). Alexander 
acknowledges that unlike in the traditional societies described by Durkheim, where 
rituals took place in closely-knit groups, in modern societies “organisations, power, 
and face-to-face confrontations are critical in determining how and to whom binary 
representations of good and evil are applied” (Alexander, 2003, p. 116). But even here, 
in complex societies, these distinctions rely on symbolic intensity and need to be 
experienced in emotional and vivid ways, through Durkheimian “collective 
effervescence”. In his analysis of emotional energy that lifts the group’s collective 
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spirit, Randall Collins wrote about “an especially Durkheimian form of short-term 
emotion”, righteous anger, that is used to enforce group cultures against perceived 
heretics or scapegoats. Righteous anger can be expressed in a particularly intense form 
because the denouncer, as Collins noted, can “express it in the secure knowledge of the 
community’s support” (Collins, 2004, p. 127). This emotion, in his opinion, finds its 
most common expression in traditional societies or wherever there is an attempt to 
create “fusion of community with polity”, such as socialist regimes (Collins, 2004, pp. 
127–129).  
Other scholars, however, have questioned the emphasis on value consensus and 
fusion achieved by collective rituals. Lukes observes that there is little evidence of 
value integration achieved by rituals and that the degree of collective effervescence is 
often overemphasised. The meanings of political rituals are prescribed by the power 
holders. Instead of focusing on emotional and social bonds, we need to address how 
the rituals act to reinforce—or, occasionally, challenge—the political status quo on a 
cognitive level, at the level of collective representations (Lukes, 1975, p. 302).6 
Garfinkel suggests that the efforts of denouncers to mobilise moral indignation 
by the participants depend on their ability to imply a malicious motivational schema 
behind individuals’ behaviour and bring the group to share it. During the ritual, which 
he names a “status degradation ceremony”, the denouncers typically claim not only 
that the particular deviant act is unacceptable, but that it is the result of some evil 
intent. Behind the familiar public façade, a new motivational schema is uncovered and 
is now seen as guiding the actions of the denounced person. Should the group 
members identify with the perpetrator and fail to experience moral indignation, the 
ritual fails (Garfinkel, 1956). 
While drawing on these theoretical approaches to rituals as mechanisms for 
reinforcing social control by ceremonially uniting the participants and reordering the 
public identity of the subject as deviant, I seek to supplement them with a micro-
sociological analysis of how the scripts of these meetings generated heterogeneous 
behaviour and unintended outcomes. This makes it possible to address complex and 
conflicting moral emotions, submerged hostilities and fears that the participants 
experience during and after the event. Rather than being united by anger, disgust or 
contempt—all the moral emotions that are the main forms of moral indignation—and 
sharing in “intuitive system of cognition” (Sunstein, 2009), people can experience an 
 
6 Garland (2005), in his study of public lynching in America, addressed the “penal excess”, the 
terrible cruelty with which victims and their bodies were debased in the name of retribution. 
Garland saw lynchings as attempts to assert the racial hierarchy, which was felt to be under threat 
from liberal legislative and political changes. 
Journal of Applied Social Theory, Vol. 1, 2021 
119 
array of emotions that defy easy categorisation. The interviews that I discuss below 
show how participants delighted in the pleasure of moral restrictiveness, even cruelty 
towards others, but could also feel fear, guilt and empathy towards the perpetrator. 
These could be experienced both in the heat of the moment and long after the event. 
In other words, the collective “feeling rules” upon which the shaming ritual relied 
(Hochschild, 1983) could clash with the actual feelings experienced by participants. 
An agreement about the shamed person may be achieved and the ceremony 
may indeed be successful in terms of undermining a member’s public reputation, but 
the unity may cover up heterogeneous emotions and motives that have little to do with 
the original transgression. Wherever we deal with ceremonies and rituals of citizens’ 
justice, we step onto treacherous ground where conflicting feelings, emotions, moral 
sentiments and meanings collide. This is where Zizek’s “obscene supplementary of 
law” is particularly valid. To Zizek, lynchings, witch hunts, show trials and other forms 
of communal law represent the “obscene underside of the Law” (Zizek, 1994, p. 57). 
Here people engage in carnivals of cruelty, enjoying the suffering of the Other. As Zizek 
points out, contrary to the idealised version of carnival beloved by Bakhtin’s followers, 
carnivals can have terroristic and sadistic properties (Zizek, 1994, p. 55). But the 
enjoyment of restrictiveness and cruelty towards others is not the only emotion that 
such public events induce. Members of society, as Zizek argues, have “an 
indeterminate Kafkaesque feeling of abstract guilt, a feeling that, in the eyes of the 
Power, I am a priori terribly guilty of something, although it is not possible for me to 
know what precisely I am guilty of” (Zizek, 1994, p. 60). Diffused guilt, a feeling of 
“there but for the grace of God go I” is also present in encounters with the Law. The 
pleasure of moral condemnation and the comforting feeling of being on the right side 
of the Law can be coupled with a fear that can induce people to be particularly ardent 
in their condemnation, but also contains the possibility of empathy with the 
perpetrator.  
Methodology 
To this point, scholars who analyse Soviet shaming meetings have mostly relied on 
organisational records, i.e. the protocols of the meetings, and on newspaper reports 
based on these original documents (for example, Halfin, 2007; Fitzpatrick, 1999; 
Kimerling, 2017; Leibovich, 2008). These protocols, however, have certain limitations 
as sources of data. They were often significantly edited after the fact. They also cannot 
sufficiently capture the unique personal and emotional dynamics of the meetings as 
individual events. According to Sigurd Schmidt, who drew on personal experience of 
these meetings, they were shaped by many factors, including individual characters and 
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motivations, interpersonal relations, group rivalries, and so on (Schmidt, 2012, p. 
516). Memoirs, diaries and other reconstructions of events by participants can allow 
us to gain deeper insight into the realm of feelings, beliefs and perceptions than that 
afforded by analysis of organisational records. They also make it possible to study 
memory and trauma, and to see how moral emotions and judgments are re-
experienced and re-evaluated in changing historical circumstances. 
In this paper, I use interviews with participants in shaming meetings that took 
place in the late Soviet Union as my main source of data. I have collected 29 oral 
history interviews with people who participated in Soviet public shaming meetings 
between 1956 and 1989. These participants lived in different areas of the Soviet Union 
at the time and participated in the meetings in a range of capacities (as active 
denouncers, witnesses or subjects). I followed an inductive, open-ended interview 
model where participants were encouraged to link individual experiences to the wider 
contexts in which they occurred. The oral history method presupposes that 
participants have valuable knowledge to share about their lives, including values, 
feelings, rituals and beliefs. It gives them an opportunity to reflect on their life 
experiences as they re-construct their stories (Leavy, 2011). All participants gave 
informed consent. I do not use their real names or the names of their organisations. I 
indicate the year (or years) and places where the events took place. 
Oral history research has certain disadvantages as a method of data collection. 
People’s recollections of events are not always reliable, and oral history is as prone to 
misrepresentation as any historical data (Lang & Mercier, 1984). Nevertheless, it 
provides access to important aspects of social reality that may be missing from other 
sources of data such as published and unpublished organisational documents.  
Despite taking place a long time ago, these events still elicited strong emotional 
memories among research participants. As Randall Collins noted, intense moments of 
participation in collective rituals are “high points not only for groups but also for 
individual lives…kept alive in symbolic replays for greater or lesser expanses of one’s 
life. These are significant formative experiences that shape individuals” (Collins, 2004, 
p. 43). All participants, both those who were shamed and those who witnessed or 
conducted the shaming, remembered the events in considerable detail and described 
what they felt at the time. Participants also reflected on the organisation of shaming, 
the personal relations that influenced the course of the meetings, and the outcome of 
the shaming for the people involved. Almost everybody presented the event in a 
broader historical context, describing how individual behaviour depended on the 
political and moral climate of the time.  
In what follows, I will analyse the recollections of the shaming events as rituals 
that, while running according to routine and conventionally understood scripts aimed 
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to produce collective moral outrage, took the participants into a space of interactional 
violence and unleashed an array of conflicting moral emotions and meanings.  
Orchestrated Anger 
Soviet shaming meetings were highly orchestrated affairs in which the denouncers 
(typically the leaders of the local Party or Komsomol organisation, managers or 
teachers) aimed, by presenting malicious motivational schemas, to produce collective 
condemnation of the accused. Accounts of meetings demonstrate that participants 
were encouraged to feel moral outrage not only at particular transgressions, but at the 
very persona of the perpetrator. The aim of the ritual was to unmask his or her “true” 
nature and show that “What he is now is what, ‘after all,’ he was all along” (Garfinkel, 
1956, p. 422).7 
The denouncers often prepared a scenario in which members of the collective 
were asked to also bring previous transgressions to the attention of the group.  
The scenario was always the same. After the main accuser has spoken, 
other people are asked to make speeches, and it is agreed in advance that 
people must bring up all the person’s character flaws. For example, not 
only did he do that, but he often came to school in a dirty shirt or was 
late to meetings. It was necessary to add all the things that presented 
him in a bad light, and this scenario repeated itself every time (Arsenii, 
Moscow, 1956).  
Even without preliminary preparation, those present at the meetings intuitively 
understood what was required of them, with some spontaneously joining in character 
assassination: 
When we were Young Pioneers, we had two delinquent guys in our class. 
Everybody knew they were thieving. And after police came to school for 
the n-th time, it was decided to exclude them from the Young Pioneer 
organisation. And there was a meeting where we had to discuss this and 
condemn them, and I remember one girl lifted a hand and said that she 
remembered how they abused a dog as well (Danila, Moscow, 1979). 
A previously unnoticed or ignored deviation was now overinterpreted in the collective 
construction of evil. But while in some cases moral indignation was mobilised around 
 
7 In Stalin-era academic witch hunts, prorabotka meetings would often be called to discuss specific mistakes in a colleague’s 
scholarship, but the discussion would soon escalate to the accusation that the colleague “deliberately made assertions that are 
contrary to Marxism-Leninism” (Gurevich, 2012, p. 36). 
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easily understood misdeeds, in others people were asked to shame individuals for 
actions the meaning of which they could not even understand. The accounts of the 
meetings show that accusations could be vague and people might struggle to 
understand them, and yet often no questions were asked. Stepan, for example, 
remembered a case from when he was 12–13, when a girl in his school year from a 
troubled family was shamed by the whole class because, as he later learned, somebody 
spread a rumour that she visited the army barracks in the neighbourhood to have sex 
with soldiers: “We had a class meeting, and she was shamed for ‘amoral behaviour’. I 
had no idea what was going on, what they were talking about” (Stepan, Moscow, 1967). 
Similarly vague accusations were made against a student at a later Komsomol 
meeting where the same interviewee was present. As Stepan recounted: 
Later on, there was another meeting of this kind at university. I could 
not understand anything either, and only later on did I figure out what 
was going on. There was a very bright student, and a good friend of the 
leader of our Komsomol organisation, who was, as I later came to 
understand, gay. At the time, sexuality was never publicly discussed—I 
sort of knew that something like this existed in the zona (penitentiary), 
but that’s all. And there was a Komsomol meeting, where he was 
expelled from the Komsomol, and later from the university, for “amoral 
behaviour”. Komsomol leaders made some vague speeches; none of us 
understood what was going on, and those who understood kept shtum. 
It was all just a ritual. A ritual civil execution (Stepan, Moscow, 1974). 
Rather than asserting communal norms and values that were broken by the 
transgressor, the meetings asserted the power of the communal law itself. Just as in 
Zizek’s conception of law, we are not required to understand the law’s injunctions. As 
Dean noted, commenting on Zizek, “We obey the incomprehensible Command. This 
traumatic, non-integrated character of law is a positive condition of law” (Dean, 2004, 
p. 13). 
The operation of communal law had little to do with due process. Unlike in the 
rational public law procedures, the accused were given little chance to defend 
themselves, to answer accusations in full. They were not shown any documents or 
other evidence in advance of the meeting, and sometimes were not even aware of the 
meeting’s purpose (thinking that they had been invited to some inconsequential 
discussion of their behaviour or even to a regular collective event that was not 
dedicated to their case). Thus, the meetings often functioned as traps, where a person 
was completely unaware of the scenario in which he or she would suddenly find 
themself treated as a transgressor by the group. While the denouncers could become 
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entrained in their own righteous anger,8 the accused would be put in a passive and 
powerless role from the very start. They were typically required to speak only at the 
very end, and even then, if they attempted to justify their behaviour or propose 
amends, their words often had no major effect. The meeting’s official decision, coded 
in terms taken from authoritative (rather than judicial) discourse, would condemn 
“amoral behaviour” (in cases of deviation from sex and gender norms), “political 
immaturity” (ideological deviations), “betrayal of the Motherland” (usually planned 
immigration to Israel), “violation of the norms of socialist communal life” (often 
meaning drunkenness in public places), etc. 
The shaming led to changes in a person’s public identity. People reported being 
shunned by their classmates, fellow students or colleagues. Institutional consequences 
also followed. These ranged from a reprimand (which went into one’s personal file) to 
demotion and expulsion from Komsomol or the Party organisation, which in turn 
resulted in losing one’s place of work or study. For male university students of 
conscription age, being expelled typically led to army service, from which students in 
full-time education were exempt. In the rare cases when the collective refused to follow 
the script and condemn a member, institutional consequences could be avoided or a 
person would suffer a less significant penalty (for example, a reprimand instead of a 
demotion or expulsion).  
The Dark Undercurrents of Collective Judgement  
The meetings gave license to emotional excess and cruelty. Previously submerged 
hostilities could now rise to the surface, and fellow students or colleagues would 
become entrained in the unforbidden pleasure of criticism, in the jouissance of 
restrictiveness towards others. People on the receiving end of shaming, meanwhile, 
experienced powerlessness, abandonment and paralysing fear. Any participation by 
one’s colleagues in the ritual was painful for the accused, even when they tried to be 
reasonable and mild in their criticism. Their very willingness to join the side of the 
denouncers was felt as a betrayal.  
Nina described a meeting at her workplace, a literary museum in Leningrad, 
that was assembled after she applied for an exit visa to emigrate to Israel on a bogus 
invitation from a non-existent Israeli uncle (a common ruse at the time, organised by 
Israeli supporters of Jewish emigration). Despite the fact that all the participants 
(apart from her boss) had been good colleagues and even friends, and the tables were 
 
8 See Collins (2008) on violent entrainment and emotional energy. 
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already set in the next room for a party after the meeting, people expressed unexpected 
hostility:  
“Who invited you?” “Who is your uncle?” “Is your uncle in Israel rich?” 
“Are you doing this because of the money?” “We trusted her, and she 
betrayed our trust.” All these words were pronounced. Yes, they said all 
these things with tongue in cheek. But it was terribly unpleasant. It was 
said that the Motherland had provided me with a free education. These 
were all my colleagues, including people with whom I went to the party 
after the prorabotka (Nina, Leningrad, 1971).  
Feelings that people were not allowed, or were embarrassed, to express publicly could 
find a sudden outlet. As the everyday norms of civility were broken, prejudices and 
hostilities could now be openly aired by people who had never publicly expressed them 
before. Mikhail recalls being shocked by the sudden animosity shown towards a 
colleague who was being denounced at his place of work, an engineering bureau: 
There was a Komsomol meeting about a fellow member, a son of a 
famous refusenik family. They wanted to emigrate to Israel. The meeting 
was fairly formal. But there was this guy, he was an alcoholic, a 
womaniser, not any kind of activist, and I never saw him as an anti-
Semite either. And yet I heard him saying that yes, this man is indeed a 
traitor to the Motherland. I was shocked at how deeply ingrained that 
was. He said it from the heart (Mikhail, Moscow, 1976).  
Very often, hostility was expressed towards individuals who occupied a privileged 
position in an organisation. Status envy fed into moral outrage at the misdeed. 
Academics spoke out against prominent figures in their field, while students 
denounced those among them who had previously enjoyed privileged positions due to 
their status in the Komsomol or the Party.  
Olga described the shaming of a student at the Moscow State University who 
was denounced for having simultaneous affairs with a young woman and her mother, 
after a young woman wrote a letter of complaint to the university. Olga admitted that 
people seemed to be engaged in especially vigorous condemnation because he was a 
Party member: 
These Party members used to be the appointed leaders of student groups 
(starosty). When we were taken to the countryside to harvest potatoes, 
they were always appointed as our supervisors, they disciplined us, they 
did not allow us to smoke, and so on. That is why there was a certain 
schadenfreude in his downfall (Olga, Moscow, 1979). 
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Larissa remembered a meeting in 1977 in a Moscow college after a fellow student was 
caught by the police buying jeans from foreigners for re-sale. The police reported him 
to the college while also accusing him of stealing a skirt from the hotel room of a 
foreign tourist with whom he had struck a deal. A student Komsomol meeting was 
convened and they voted to expel him from the Komsomol, which automatically led to 
expulsion from college. His rumoured privileged position contributed to the readiness 
to participate in condemnation: 
We all heard (although this was just a rumour) that he was the nephew 
of the candidate member of the Politburo, Aleksandrov, and somebody 
said when we were discussing whether he should be expelled from 
Komsomol, “Don’t you worry, he’ll get reinstated in a year’s time and 
work where none of us has any chance of working. So this is nothing 
serious. He’ll have a little break and then get readmitted.” Personally, I 
was indignant about the theft of a foreign visitor’s skirt and said publicly 
that he brought shame on the Soviet people. There was absolutely no 
pity, none. First, I thought, it’s wrong to steal, and second, there was this 
general opinion that he would get a job somewhere where none of us 
would even get let in the building. Who knows, maybe this was class 
hatred, maybe Aleksandrov wasn’t even his uncle—it’s a common 
enough surname—but people said, “Don’t feel sorry for him, the time 
will come when you have to bow before him.”  
We observe here what Nietzsche described as ressentiment (1996), where people 
manifest intolerance and envy towards those who have achieved success.9 Gender 
shaming was also often present, either on its own or mixed with other motives. Sonya 
was 18 when she started working for a tour company in the Ukrainian town of 
Kramatorsk. One day her friend, also a young woman, told her that, thanks to her 
connections in the local Komsomol, there was a rare opportunity for the two of them 
to go to Bulgaria with a delegation from the city Komsomol organisation. All they had 
to do was to have a quick medical check, pass an interview at the city Komsomol 
organisation, and get a character reference from their place of work. Everything 
seemed to be ready for them to go, but suddenly their colleagues refused to give them 
a good reference: 
A meeting was called where older people who worked as tour guides, 
tour planners, or accountants were present. They practically took us 
apart, found all kinds of faults with our performance, and one of the 
 
9 Ranulf (1938) argued that punitiveness flows from envy, resentment and moral indignation experienced by people in 
subordinate class positions. 
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strongest accusations was (this was later put in writing when they gave 
us the references) that when we’d travelled to Volgograd with a tour 
group, we were running all over the train just in thick tights, without 
skirts or trousers. Why they said tights I don’t know—these were warm 
leggings. It was in the middle of winter and we were cold. And this was 
enough to say that we were guilty of "amoral behaviour" and that we 
were irresponsible. And they also said: “We are two, three times older 
than you, and we have never been abroad.” And I was so traumatised 
that I resigned from that job straight away. They were very animated, 
these men and women, and the feeling was: we can’t go, so you will not 
go either. We are three times as old as you, and you’ve just started 
working, you do not deserve this. I think this was their main motivation, 
not to give someone an opportunity that they lacked themselves (Sonya, 
Kramatorsk, 1974). 
Fear, Embarrassment, Guilt 
The pleasure of restrictiveness towards others in the name of moral law, the thrill of 
entering a forbidden domain in the name of duty, or mere enjoyment and comfort of 
being on the right side of the law, is often coupled with generalised guilt and fear 
(Zizek, 1991, p. 83). The participants’ accounts indeed show that moral indignation 
often went hand in hand with enjoyment of peeking into the forbidden, as well as the 
vague “guilt feeling”, a sense that one too could be guilty in the eyes of the Power. Olga, 
in her account of the meeting when a fellow student was shamed for his simultaneous 
affairs with mother and daughter, described a sense of prurient fascination with the 
forbidden as well as a sense of general discomfort as people felt they too were 
potentially vulnerable: 
Many of us felt uneasy. On the one hand, there was laughter and banter. 
It was a long meeting and people wanted to know the details, what he 
felt about all this, how he managed to be with two women at once, was 
he repentant and so on. But at the same time, we were also unhappy that 
such things were being discussed publicly. Yes, of course, things can be 
talked about, but we felt we were free individuals and we did not want 
the details of our own personal lives to be discussed the same way (Olga, 
Moscow, 1979). 
According to the memoirs of sociologist Igor Kon, fear was one of the main emotions 
among the participants of the Soviet prorabotka meetings: 
It is difficult to recover from this experience. When it’s you who is 
beaten, at least you develop some psychological resistance. But when 
you witness the beating of others, you mostly feel vulnerable yourself, 
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fearful that this can happen to you as well. In order to suppress this fear, 
one tried to believe that may be “these people” are indeed guilty, and you 
are different, and this will not happen to you (Kon, 2008, p. 14).  
Stepan remembered a meeting in a Moscow school in 1973 dedicated to the violation 
of a sacred object, a symbol of collective identity—a classic case of ritual denunciation 
(Giesen, 2006, p. 332). In this case, this was a portrait of Lenin: 
The whole school was called for an emergency meeting in the assembly 
hall. One girl used a cloth with which she had washed the floor to wipe 
the dust from Vladimir Ilyich’s portrait. And a teacher saw it, and made 
a kind of show out of it, told us how terrible that was, how could she have 
made this sacrilege. I still remember that horror, that atmosphere of 
nauseating fear. Everybody thought, thank God it was not me (Stepan, 
Moscow, 1973). 
Sometimes the denouncers were implicated in the very same misdemeanours and lived 
in fear of being discovered. This may have accounted for added vigour in denunciation. 
Polina, who lived in Iskitim, a small town in Novosibirsk region, recounted how her 
friend was shamed at a meeting convened after he applied to join the Communist Party 
at the end of the 1980s. The chief denouncer, a Party secretary, told the attendees that 
the friend could not join the Party because he was divorced. However, there was gossip 
that she was a divorcée herself. In an attempt to maintain the pretence of being 
married, she kept a pair of men’s slippers and a coat near the front door of her flat for 
the visitors to see. 
The situational fear was often followed by a long-lasting sense of guilt. One such 
example was recounted by Evgenii, who attended a prorabotka meeting at work:  
I worked at the conservatory at the time. We had a collective meeting 
about one musician who was detained by the police in the street for 
being drunk. They reported him to the conservatory authorities and a 
meeting was called to condemn him. I didn’t say anything, but many 
people made speeches. Some did so in order to support the management 
(as all the protocols of the meeting were already prepared), and some 
really thought that he brought shame upon the conservatory. I kept quiet 
and felt very embarrassed about my behaviour afterwards (Evgenii, 
Kazan, 1986). 
The denouncers, too, could feel guilt afterwards. Larissa admitted that she now feels 
guilty for speaking out at the meeting and wonders if the story about the theft of the 
skirt was a fabrication by the police: 
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Now I think: did he really steal the skirt, or were we just told this by the 
management? When I was talking at the meeting, I kept talking 
indignantly about the skirt, and he (the accused student) told me, “Why 
do you keep going on about this skirt?” I was thinking about this story 
recently and I suddenly thought that maybe everything was not as we 
were told, maybe this was a cover-up for something else, but I naïvely 
believed everything then. 
Emotions of moral indignation and fear grew in intensity or subsided depending upon 
the moral climate of the time. A common feature of accounts were reflections on the 
specific time in Soviet history when the meetings took place and how this historical 
context influenced the strength of the collective condemnation and the consequences, 
both for the accused persons and those who attempted to defend them (or wanted to 
but were deterred by fear). A frequent refrain in the interviews that described post-
Stalin meetings was that this was not the Stalin era. The routine character of many of 
the meetings, the lack of “real” passion and the absence of the terrible consequences 
that befell those people who were denounced under Stalin’s totalitarian regime figured 
prominently in people’s accounts of the morality plays that they witnessed: 
This was 1971 and not 1950. This was just inertia [from earlier times], 
not like the terrible trials under Stalin. My father had experienced such 
a meeting, and in four days he was fired and arrested. And I knew of 
course that this would not happen to me. …What happened to me was a 
pale imitation, this was the inertia of a dying system that had lost its 
mind. It was terrible, but I could still say something. And I said, thank 
you all for the great play that you showed me (Nina, Leningrad, 1971). 
Already by the 1960s, but especially towards the 1980s, the rituals seemed to have lost 
much of their emotional energy, and people who witnessed them sometimes 
remembered the meetings almost as non-events, with the audience passive and 
indifferent. But even when people maintained a cynical distance from the Soviet 
regime and its moral norms and took part in the ritual without identifying with it, they 
still regulated their public behaviour in accordance with its symbolic order.10 The 
meetings, these expressions of “popular justice”, ultimately confirmed the 
authoritative discourse, and the power of the administrative-political agents who 
stood behind it. 
 
10 Zizek calls this form of power “manipulative authority” (Zizek, 1991, pp. 94–95). 
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For those shamed, the meetings were highly traumatic ordeals. The lack of 
support from colleagues, friends, or parents (in the case of schoolchildren), 
reputational damage, and practical consequences (being expelled from college, moved 
to another class in school, demoted at work, or receiving an official reprimand that 
went into one’s file) left a sense of injustice and disaffection. Feelings of 
disillusionment with the Soviet system, as well as one’s colleagues and friends, 
remained with such interviewees for many years after the event. The meetings were 
also traumatic for people who witnessed the shaming of others, exposing them to 
cruelty and fear, and creating a long-term sense of injustice. 
Conclusion 
The shaming meetings drew the moral line between good and evil while inviting 
participants to come up with negative judgements not just about specific behaviours, 
but also about the personality of the perpetrator, assassinating their character as a 
whole. Unlike formal legal procedures, these acts of communal justice relied on 
amplified emotions and intuitively-understood interpretative schemas and afforded 
little protection to the accused.  
These violent events invited members of the collective to experience jouissance 
from restrictiveness and punitiveness towards the other. They encouraged the 
unleashing of conflicting moral emotions and psychic processes, and previously 
submerged and repressed hostilities would find a sudden—and socially approved—
outlet. But the expression of collective violence, whether powered by emotions born 
out of righteous indignation, resentment and envy, or simply following the 
conventional scripts, had an undercurrent of mortifying fear, shame and guilt—and 
not just for the accused. Instead of repairing social bonds, the shaming rituals left 
trauma and ruptures in their wake. Nevertheless, they were highly consequential in 
asserting the power of communal law—even if the meaning of the law remained vague 
and consensus about the meaning of the deviant act was not achieved.  
The meetings can be seen as a historical case of the “ostentatious” and 
“emotive” punishment that is increasingly becoming a feature of modern society 
(Pratt, 2000). The feelings of righteous indignation experienced by accusers, the 
frequent focus on gender role shaming, the added pleasure in bringing down people 
who are seen to occupy privileged positions, and the profound consequences for the 
personal and social identity of the accused are all features of Soviet-era public shaming 
that are also present in modern-day moral campaigns (Ronson, 2015). Of course, the 
Soviet case differed from contemporary campaigns in the sense that representatives of 
the political authority often played a significant role, directing the collective 
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performances explicitly or behind the scenes. However, it should be noted that modern 
organisations also frequently play a central role in staging collective events of 
condemnation, defining the procedural rules and presenting a moral framework in 
which accusations get played out.  
Many of my interviewees, reflecting on the lessons they learned from taking 
part in the Soviet meetings, said that they felt that that history can repeat itself at any 
time, given the “right” organisational framework and conditions. Reflecting on the 
lessons of the meetings, people reported acquiring depressing insights into human 
nature, becoming aware of the potential for a sudden welling-up of cruelty, the sickly 
fear of authority and the collective judgement that paralyses the will, and the cowed 
conformism towards the group that most individuals tend to demonstrate. They also 
explained that their memories of the meetings have made them suspicious of any 
forms of collective moral campaign.  
Ultimately, for all the potential benefits of informal justice, it is an imperfect 
and dangerous tool. Contrary to the post-Enlightenment historical process that has 
created, through public law, mechanisms for restraining emotions, it reintroduces 
violence into public life. The lessons of the Soviet shaming meetings show how 
oppressive this democratisation of justice can be. 
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